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1. Introduction  
 
Each year, Australia raises and slaughters approximately half a billion farm animals, 
making it one of the world’s largest producers of farm animals.
2
 The Australian 
Government and the agricultural sector claim that Australia is an international leader in 
animal welfare.
3
 Australia has a wide-ranging system of Commonwealth, State and 
Territory legislation, as well as regulations and industry codes, which regulate farm 
                                                 
1
 The author is an admitted solicitor who works at Animals Australia, one of Australia's leading animal 
protection organisations, as a Legal Officer. Aimee is also the Co-Founder of The Animal Law Institute, 
a community legal centre that is dedicated to protecting animals and advocating for their interests through 
the Australian legal system. 
2
 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012) ‘Livestock Slaughterings and Products’ Australian Farming in 
Brief, Cat No 7106.0, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.   
3
 Department of Agriculture (2011) ‘Australian Animal Welfare Strategy and National Implementation 
Place 2010-2014’, 23 November 2011.  




animal welfare. This paper argues that the existing framework fails to effectively protect 
farm animals from cruelty, and that an effective way to improve farm animal welfare 
would be to establish a federal Independent Office of Animal Welfare (IOAW).  
 
Part One of this paper will examine the current framework in Australia for the protection 
of farm animals, including the current laws, regulations and codes. However, this paper 
will not focus on farm animals used in live export from Australia, as this is a distinct area 
of regulation which falls outside the parameters of this paper.  
 
Part Two of this paper will examine how the current framework is failing to protect farm 
animals. The concept of regulatory capture will be described and analysed. Drawing on 
regulatory literature to critique the current situation in Australia’s farm animal welfare 
system, it will be argued that regulatory capture exists due to the conflicts of interest 
present in the responsible regulatory departments.  
 
Having established the key reason for regulatory capture in Australia’s farm animal 
welfare framework in Part Two, Part Three will discuss common flow-on effects that are 
usually present in industries experiencing regulatory capture. Drawing on evidence from 
regulatory studies, a comparative analysis will be undertaken, demonstrating that a 
number of these key effects are present in Australia’s farm animal welfare framework, 
including: 
i) evidence of strong industry influence on the regulator;  
ii) a serious lack of enforcement by the regulator; and  
iii) evidence of the regulator advocating for industry. 
 
Part Four will discuss how the current regulatory framework could be reformed to 
address the issues analysed in the previous three parts. It will be posited that an effective 
reform would be to create a federal IOAW, which would allow for the separation of the 
existing conflicting responsibilities of the regulator. An analysis of the functions, powers 
and operations of the IOAW will be undertaken, demonstrating that the IOAW could 
significantly reduce the existing regulatory failures and provide enhanced protection for 
farm animals. Part Four will conclude with an examination of how the IOAW could be 
created, including a brief analysis of the constitutional issues that may arise.  
 
As a final introductory point, this paper focuses on the existing regulatory framework and 
will argue for change to improve that framework. This reflects a pragmatic choice, given 
that alternative solutions, in particular the complete abolition of the production of animals 
for food, are not likely to occur in the foreseeable future.
4
  
                                                 
4
 See for example: Gary Francione, ‘The Abolition of Animal Exploitation’ in Gary Francione and Robert 
Garner, The Animal Rights Debate – Abolition or Regulation? (Columbia University Press, 2010) 1.  





2. Part One – The current farm animal welfare framework  
 
2.1   Laws, regulations and codes 
 
Australia currently has a complex system of animal cruelty legislation, regulation and 
codes governing the protection of farm animal welfare within the agriculture industry. 
Farm animal welfare is regulated by a myriad of enforceable and voluntary standards.  
 
All Australian States and Territories have laws and regulations that aim to prevent animal 
cruelty.
5
 However, most of these laws and regulations provide exemptions for farm 
animals, such as cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and chickens, by defining them separately as 
‘stock’.
 6
 This allows for these animals to be exempt from certain legislative protections 
that are provided to other animals, such as companion animals. For example, the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) provides for stock to be specifically 
exempt from the requirement that animals receive adequate exercise, making it lawful for 




Additionally, compliance with non-legislative instruments may provide the basis for an 
exemption from cruelty offences. Non-legislative instruments include Commonwealth 
policies, standards and model codes of practice for the welfare of animals (MCOPs). 
These MCOPs are produced by the Council of Australian Governments and endorsed by 
the Primary Industries Ministerial Council (PIMC). Although these MCOPs have no legal 
standing and are not enforceable, they do play an important role in farm animal welfare in 
Australia. The MCOPs are commonly adopted under State and Territory legislation, 
either in total
8
 or in a modified form.
9
 Most animal cruelty legislation states that 
compliance with these codes of practice is a defence to acts of cruelty. For example, in 
Queensland, acts that would normally be considered cruelty if performed on a companion 
animal, such as castration, dehorning, and debeaking of animals without anaesthetic, do 
not attract animal cruelty charges in farming situations, as they are procedures considered 
acceptable in the MCOPs.
10
 This essentially means that what is provided for in the 
                                                 
5
 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW); Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA); Animal Welfare Act 
1993 (Tas); Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic); Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA); Animal 
Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld); Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT); Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NT). 
6
 See for example, Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 26; Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 
13(2)(e). 
7
 See, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s 9(1)(a) and Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NT) s 
11(3).  
8
 For example, in Queensland, the Australian 'Model code of practice for the welfare of animals - domestic 
poultry (4th edition)' is an adopted code under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld). 
9
 For example, the Victorian Government incorporates the MCOPs into its own codes Victorian Codes of 
Practice for Animal Welfare. 
10
 See Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld), s 40.  




MCOPs forms part of the legally acceptable standards for the treatment of farm animals 
in Australia.  
 
Further, some of these MCOPs have recently been converted into legally enforceable 
Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines,
11
 through State and Territory 
governments implementing these standards as law. For example, in 2014, Queensland 
implemented the Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines – Land Transport 
of Livestock as a compulsory requirement under the Animal Care and Protection 
Regulation 2012 (Qld).
12
 These standards are enforceable, and as with the MCOPs, 
compliance with them will provide an exemption to cruelty offences.
13
 It was the 
intention to transform all MCOPs into nationally consistent animal welfare standards and 
guidelines. However, it is uncertain if this will be achieved given recent changes to the 




2.2   Responsible regulators 
 
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) is the regulatory 
department at the Commonwealth level responsible for farm animal welfare.
15
 Until 
recently, DAFF was responsible for developing the AAWS, which created a national 
framework to identify priorities, coordinate stakeholder action and improve consistency 
across all animal use sectors.
16
  However, in 2013, the Federal Government cut all 
funding from the AAWS, effectively ending its role as a national coordinator of farm 
animal welfare reform. The Federal Government also abolished the Australian Animal 
Welfare Advisory Committee (AAWAC).
17
 The AAWAC advised the Federal Minister 
and assisted in the development of guidelines for animal welfare, which were reported to 




At a State and Territory level, the responsible regulatory departments are the Department 
of Primary Industries (or its equivalent). These departments generally have the 
responsibility to enact and administer animal welfare laws and regulations. As mentioned 
                                                 
11
 See for example, Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines – Land Transport of Livestock. 
12
 Schedule 3, Animal Care and Protection Regulation 2012 (Qld). 
13
 For example, the Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines – Land Transport of Livestock 
was incorporated into Schedule 3 of the Animal Care and Protection Regulation 2012 (Qld). 
14
 See Department of Agriculture, Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines (Model Codes of 
Practice) (16 September 2014) <http://www.agriculture.gov.au/animal-plant-health/welfare/standards-
guidelines>. 
15
 See generally, Department of Agriculture’s website: <http://www.daff.gov.au>. 
16
 See generally, Department of Agriculture, Animal Welfare, Australian Animal Welfare Strategy, (15 July 
2014) <http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health/welfare/aaws>. 
17
 See for example Voiceless, Animal law in the spotlight: 2014 Federal Budget, (6 June 2014) Voiceless – 
The Animal Protection Institute <https://www.voiceless.org.au/content/animal-law-spotlight-2014-federal-
budget>.  
18
 Alex Bruce, Animal Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 1
st
 ed, 2012), 78. 




above, States and Territories generally attempt to incorporate the Commonwealth 
policies, standards and MCOPs into such laws and regulations. However, this process is 
often inconsistent, as States and Territories can decide to accept the codes in full, partly, 
or not at all.
19





3. Part Two – The failure of Australia’s farm animal welfare framework  
 
3.1   Introduction to regulatory capture 
 
Having outlined the existing framework for farm animal welfare in Australia in Part One, 
Part Two will examine how this framework fails to protect farm animals. Drawing on 
regulatory theories to analyse the current framework, it will be argued that regulatory 
capture is present due to conflicts of interest in the responsible regulatory departments.  
 
Regulatory capture is a theory of regulation which describes the situation where an 
industry, subject to a regulatory regime, acquires influence disproportionate to the 
balance of interests that the regulation was designed to serve.
21
 Regulatory capture exists 
where the subject regulation, in law or application, is consistently directed away from the 
public interest towards the interests of the regulated industry.
22
 Regulatory capture can be 
detected where regulators serve the interests of the industry being regulated rather than 
the public interest.
23
   
 
3.2   Regulatory capture in Australia’s farm animal welfare framework 
 
The existing regulatory framework for the protection of farm animal welfare creates an 
environment where regulatory capture would very likely exist. The relevant industry is 
the animal agricultural industries, including the cattle, pork, egg and chicken meat 
industries. The relevant public interest is the protection and advancement of animal 
welfare in Australia. The justification for animal welfare laws being in the public interest 
has been long established,
24
 with it being recognised that Australians value animals and 
                                                 
19
 Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice For The 
Welfare of Animals (2005), 9. 
20
 Bruce, above n 17, 81. 
21
 Lawrence Baxter, ‘Capture in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel it Toward the Common Good?’ 
(2011) Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 27, 176. 
22
 Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, ‘Introduction’ in Daniel Carpenter and David A. Ross (eds), 
Preventing Regulatory Capture – Special interest influence and how to limit it (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 1, 13.  
23
 Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian 
Business Regulatory Agencies (Oxford University Press, 1
st
 ed, 1986) 198. 
24
 Steven White, ‘Legislating for animal welfare – making the interests of animals count’, (2003) 28(6) 
Alternative Law Journal 277, 278.  






 and that harming animals indirectly harms the interests of humans.
26
 
Primary industry departments at both the Commonwealth and State/Territory levels are 
the relevant regulators and have responsibility for both the relevant farm animal industry 
and the public interest of animal welfare in Australia.  
 
The primary cause of regulatory capture in Australia’s farm animal welfare system is the 
design of the existing regulatory framework. Poor regulatory design can lead to situations 
of regulatory capture where the regulator and industry have such a close alignment of 
primary goals that it is inevitable that the regulator will serve the interest of the regulated 
industry and not the public interest. This alignment allows industry to strongly influence 





The poor regulatory design in farm animal welfare directly causes the regulatory agencies 
to have conflicting responsibilities. The primary goal of these departments is the 
promotion of profitable and competitive farm businesses and industries.
28
 For example, 
DAFF’s website states that its role is to ‘develop and implement policies and programs 
that ensure Australia's agricultural, fisheries, food and forestry industries remain 
competitive, profitable and sustainable.’
29
 However, these departments also carry the 
responsibility for regulating farm animal welfare.  For example, Biosecurity Queensland, 
a unit of the Queensland Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, is the 
‘Government's lead agency for animal welfare activities in Queensland’, responsible for 
developing, monitoring and enforcing animal welfare policy, legislation and standards.
30
   
 
At face value, these two responsibilities – supporting profitable industries and protecting 
animal welfare – seem to be complementary. This is commonly the position argued by 
industry. Australian Pork, for example, states that ‘producers understand…that providing 
excellent care results in a contented animal that provides a high quality product—pig 
producers’ livelihoods depend on it.’
31
  Further, a number of members of parliament have 
echoed this opinion. Mr Jai Rowell, Member for Wollondilly in the New South Wales 
Parliament, stated, ‘Animals that are mistreated are not as productive as those that are 
                                                 
25
 See Australian Animal Welfare Strategy Vision: <http://www.agriculture.gov.au/animal-plant-
health/welfare/aaws>. 
26
 White, above n 23, 278. 
27
 Adams, G Hayes, S Weierter, S & Boyd, J ‘Regulatory Capture: Managing the Risk’ (2007) Australian 
Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference, Sydney, 6. 
28
 Arnja Dale, ‘Animal Welfare Codes and Regulations - The Devil in Disguise?’ in Celeste Black, Peter 
Sankoff and Steven White (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (Federation Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2013) 174, 185. 
29
 Department of Agriculture, About Us, (1 August 2014) <http://www.daff.gov.au/about>. 
30
 Queensland Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Animal welfare and ethics, (1 August 
2014) <http://www.daff.qld.gov.au/animal-industries/welfare-and-ethics>. 
31
 Australian Pork Limited, Animal Welfare, (3 August 2014) <http://australianpork.com.au/industry-
focus/animal-welfare/>. 









However, on closer examination, these two responsibilities conflict and have a negative 
relationship.
 33
 Extensive economic studies into this relationship reveal that while welfare 
and productivity can be complementary at low levels of output, high levels of 
productivity and profitability will ultimately come at the expense of welfare.
34
 As 





Further, welfare considerations usually only include animals’ physical welfare and not 
their psychological welfare. It is not unusual for an animal’s behavioural or psychological 
wellbeing to be affected by poor farming conditions, while their physical health remains 
satisfactory.
36
 Animals can maintain their physical health by triggering coping 
mechanisms such as ‘non-injurious pathological behaviours’, which are commonly 
assisted by the use of antibiotics.
37
 A key example of this conflict is the battery cage 
system, where up to 20 hens are placed in one cage and allocated space that is equivalent 
to an A4 sheet of paper to spend their life.
38
 Whilst this system allows for high 
productivity in the smallest amount of space, it has detrimental effects on hens’ 
psychological health, as it denies them the ability to carry out their natural behaviours.
39
 
Although hens commonly survive in this environment and continue to produce eggs, it 
causes acute suffering.
40
 As Rollin stated ‘it is more economically efficient to put a 
greater number of birds into each cage, accepting lower productivity per bird but greater 
productivity per cage…chickens are cheap, cages are expensive.’
41
   
 
                                                 
32
 Mr Jai Rowell, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Amendment Bill, NSW Legislative Council, 12 
September 2012.  
33
 Jed Goodfellow, ‘Animal Welfare Law Enforcement: To Punish or Persuade?’ in Peter Sankoff, Steven 
White (eds), Animal Law in Australasia (Federation Press, ed 2, 2013) 183, 200.  
34
 Ibid.  
35 Gaverick Matheny and Cheryl Leahy, ‘Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and Trade’ (2007) 70(1) 
Law and Contemporary Problems 325, 328. 
36
 Donald Broom, ‘Animal welfare: future knowledge, attitudes and solutions’, paper presented at the 
Australian Animal Welfare Strategy International Animal Welfare Conference, Gold Coast, 31 August 
2008.  
37
 Ibid.  
38
 In Queensland, a 7(2)(a) Animal Care and Protection Regulation 2012 (Qld) states that if three or more 
domestic laying fowls are kept in a cage, the minimum floor area for cages post 2001 is 550cm
2
. This 
equates to less than one A4 piece of paper per chicken based on an A4 page, with sides of 21.0 cm x 29.7 




 These natural behaviours include dust bathing, laying eggs in private, scratching and perching. See H. El-
Lethey, V. Aerni, T.W. Jungi and B Wechsler, ‘Stress and feather pecking in laying hens in relation to 
housing conditions’ (2000) 41 British Poultry Science 22. 
40
 Ibid.  
41
 Matheny and Leahy, above n 34, 329.  




As profitable industries are the foremost goal of the regulator, the goal of maintaining the 
public interest of animal welfare is subordinated. As Biber commented, it is common for 
agencies with conflicting goals to systematically underperform on their secondary goals 
in order to achieve their primary goals, especially where the secondary goals interfere 
with achieving the primary goal and are not easily monitored or measured.
42
 This directly 
reflects the farm animal welfare regulatory environment in Australia. Further, as the 
regulated industry has the same primary goal as the regulator, their influence over the 
regulator is significantly greater than those advocating for the secondary goal of animal 
welfare.  
 
Both these points demonstrate that it is highly likely that regulatory capture exists in 
Australia’s farm animal welfare framework. This causes regulators to be consistently 
influenced by industry to serve their interests, resulting in the failure of the regulatory 
departments to effectively address animal protection, with the public interest of farm 
animal welfare subordinated.  
 
4.  Part Three – Effects of regulatory capture in the farm animal 
welfare framework  
 
4.1   Effects of regulatory capture 
 
As argued in Part Two, it is highly likely that regulatory capture exists in Australia’s farm 
animal welfare framework. Part Three will examine the generally recognised effects of 
regulatory capture, demonstrating that a number of these effects currently exist in 
Australia’s farm animal welfare framework. This analysis serves two purposes in 
advancing the overall thesis: it supports the contention that regulatory capture exists, and 
shows the dire state of farm animal protection, suggesting a need for extensive reform.  
 
There are a number of generally recognised effects of regulatory capture: 
 Disproportionate influence by industry;43 
 Lack of enforcement by the regulator; 44 and  
 The regulator adopting an advocacy role for the regulated industry.45 
 
Each of these will be considered in turn in a farm animal context. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Eric Biber, ‘Too many things to do: How to deal with the dysfunctions of multiple-goal agencies’ 
(2009) Harvard Environmental Law Review 1, 4.  
43




 Gary Adams, Sharon Hayes, Stuart Weierter & John Boyd, Regulatory Capture: Managing the Risk 
(2007) Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference, Sydney, 5. 




4.2   Disproportionate industry influence 
 
A key effect of regulatory capture is that industry disproportionately influences the 
regulator,
46
 which commonly eventuates as a result of industry providing technical 
support to the regulator in areas relating to the subject regulation.
47
 Industry 
representatives playing a key role in drafting legislation, regulations or standards is a 




This disproportionate influence is evident in Australia’s farm animal welfare framework, 
with industry wielding significant influence over the regulators in relation to animal 
welfare regulations. As mentioned in Part One, the MCOPs are relied upon for setting the 
minimum standard of animal welfare and are commonly adopted by the States and 
Territories. Industry provides technical support to the regulator and their guidance 
heavily influences the minimum welfare standards. A range of participants from industry 
are heavily involved in the drafting of the MCOPs.
49
 The Animal Welfare Working 
Group, which is made up of a number of representatives including Animal Health 
Australia (AHA),
50
 has the responsibility of developing MCOPs.
51
 AHA is a non-profit 
public company made up of government and industry representatives, including Australia 
Pork Limited and the Cattle Council of Australia.
52
 This allows industry to assist in the 
drafting of MCOPs, with their input undoubtedly exerting disproportionate influence on 
the standards set in the MCOPs, when compared with that of animal welfare 
representatives. This is worsened by the fact that public consultation does not routinely 
occur throughout the process of developing MCOPs,
53
 further evidencing industry’s 
disproportionate dominance in the non-government representation.
54
 Further, although 
wider public consultation was evident in the drafting stages of the national standards and 
guidelines mentioned above, industry was still heavily influential and essentially 
controlled the content of those standards.
55
  
                                                 
46
 Baxter, above n 20. 
47
 Adams, Hayes, Weierter & Boyd, above n 44, 5. 
48
 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The capture theory of regulations – revisited’ (2009) 46 Symposium: Public Dilemmas 
Revisited 319, 320.  
49
 Elizabeth Ellis, ‘Making Sausages and Law: The Failure of Animal Welfare Laws To Protect Both 
Animals and Fundamental Tenets of Australia’s Legal System’ (2010) 4 Australian Animal Protection Law 
Journal 6, 14. 
50
 Ibid 15. 
51
 Ellis, above 48, 15. 
52
 Ellis, above 48, 15. 
53
 Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice For The 
Welfare of Animals (2005), 7.  
54
 Dale, above n 27, 185.  
55
 See: Department of Agriculture, Review of the Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines Development 
Process, (16 September 2014) < http://www.agriculture.gov.au/animal-plant-health/welfare/standards-
guidelines/review-animal-welfare-standards-and-guidelines-development-process>. 





It is not unreasonable or unexpected for a regulator to approach key stakeholders, such as 
industry, in an attempt to gain a working understanding of the practicalities when drafting 
regulations. However, the farm animal industry’s influence on its regulator is 
disproportionate, with industry being able to strongly influence the regulator. The 
Neumann Report found that involvement of industry in the code development process 




The fact that industry influences the codes to reflect their own desired standards is further 
evidenced by reports finding that contemporary science is not commonly considered 
throughout the code drafting process,
57
 nor are international welfare standards taken into 
account.
58
 A clear example of this is Australia’s failure to recognise welfare 
developments internationally, including the bans on certain intensive farming systems 
such as battery cages and sow stalls in the European Union and New Zealand.
59
 Further, 
industry has significant influence and control over animal welfare science in Australia, 
meaning that even where ‘scientific research’ is relied upon, it is likely that the research 




Industry’s influence is disproportionate in Australia’s farm animal framework, with 
industry influencing the minimum standards for welfare.
 61
 This further evidences the 
existence of regulatory capture and demonstrates the need for reform.  
 
4.3   Lack of enforcement 
 
Lack of adequate enforcement by the regulator is another common effect of regulatory 
capture.
62
 Captured regulators commonly perpetrate cultures of non-enforcement, fail to 
monitor compliance and do not support inspectors to follow through with serious 
investigations or prosecutions.
63
 Weakened enforcement is a well-known way for 
regulation to become non-applicable or only selectively applicable, without the need to 
                                                 
56
 Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice For The 
Welfare of Animals (2005), 10.  
57
 Ibid ii.  
58
 Peter Sankoff, ‘Five years of the “new” animal welfare regime: lessons learned from New Zealand’s 
decision to modernize its animal welfare legislation’, (2005) 11(7) Animal Law 7, 23.  
59
 Arnja Dale, above n 27, 189. 
60
 Glenys Oogjes, ‘Australian Land Transport Standards and Guidelines: Is the new review process 
providing protection for transported farm animals?’ (2011) 6 Australian Animal Protection Law Journal 8, 
16-18. 
61
 Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice For The 
Welfare of Animals (2005), 10.  
62
 Baxter, above n 20. 
63
 David Turton, ‘Wading in: environmental governance and Queensland’s Clean Waters Act 1971’ (2010) 
17 James Cook University Law Review 46, 64.  




expressly alter regulation ‘on the books’.
64
 This situation is evident in Australia’s farm 
animal framework, with enforcement of animal welfare laws and regulations seriously 
lacking and prosecutions rarely being brought against the industry.  
 
The first issue is that, in order for enforcement to occur, breaches must be detected and 
reported, which is difficult within the current framework. Farm animal welfare 
inspectorate and enforcement responsibilities rest either with the relevant State or 
Territory departments or are delegated to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals (RSPCA). Where the responsible department does retain control over 
inspections and enforcement, routine inspections for animal welfare compliance are 
rarely carried out, with investigations usually being instigated by tip-offs from third 
parties.
65
 For example, in both Queensland and Victoria, the responsible departments
66
 
retain responsibility for the inspection and enforcement of farm animal welfare, however 
neither conducts routine inspections of intensive piggeries.
67
 Instead, investigations only 
occur if allegations of cruelty are made.
68
 Further, where inspections do occur, the 
legislation usually requires notice be provided to the owner in advance, reducing the 




This reluctance to investigate and prosecute was evident in Department of Local 
Government and Regional Development v Emanuel Exports Pty Ltd & Ors.
70
 The 
Director-General of the Department of Local Government and Regional Development in 
Western Australia
71
 only investigated complaints of animal cruelty made by Animals 
Australia approximately two years after the complaints were made, following an order 
nisi for a writ of mandamus by the Western Australian Supreme Court, which led to the 




Further, regulators fail to provide appropriate resources for inspection and enforcement, 
which worsens enforcement issues. In some States and Territories, the responsible 
department delegates its inspection and enforcement responsibilities to the RSPCA, 
                                                 
64
 Amitai Etzioni, ‘The capture theory of regulations – revisited’ (2009) 46 Symposium: Public Dilemmas 
Revisited 319, 320.  
65
 Deborah Cao, Animal Law in Australia and New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 2010), 216.  
66
 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry in Queensland; and the Department of Primary 
Industries in Victoria.  
67
 Animals Australia, ‘How agriculture industry audits are failing Australian animals’, 14 August 2014 < 
http://www.animalsaustralia.org/features/industry-audits-failing-animals.php>. 
68
 Ibid.  
69
 See for example Animal Welfare Act 1985 (SA), s 31 and Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld), ss 
122-124. 
70
 Department of Local Government and Regional Development v Emanuel Exports Pty Ltd & Ors (Perth 
Magistrates Court, Crawford M; judgment given 8 February 2008). 
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 The person responsible for instigating proceedings under the Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA). 
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 Graeme McEwen, Animal Law: Principles and Frontiers, (15 August 2014) Barristers Animal Welfare 
Panel, 246 < http://bawp.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/eBook-FINAL.pdf>. 




which is a charity organisation. Not only is it extremely rare for a public interest statute 
to be enforced by a charity, the RSPCA has reported that it only receives approximately 
2% of its annual income from government funding, noting that its resources are routinely 
stretched, thus making enforcement difficult.
 73
 Whilst this paper is not alleging that the 
RSPCA is in a state of regulatory capture, it is argued that it has a limited ability to 
routinely inspect and investigate farm animal facilities, and when it does detect breaches 





This is possibly a result of the responsible regulator not providing the RSPCA with 
appropriate resources to carry out the delegated duties, and demonstrates a lack of 
concern for enforcement by the regulator. As Neumann reported, the most important 
factors leading to the lack of enforcement in animal welfare are resourcing issues, and 
notably, a lack of will on behalf of the regulator to enforce the regulations.
75
 This passive 
attitude towards breaches of welfare regulations and reluctance to prosecute has 




This situation is worsened due to the inconsistencies between animal welfare laws and 
regulations across Australia. Neumann commented that uniform enforcement is 
fundamental to the achievement of good welfare outcomes and an improvement in the 
international community’s views on Australia’s animal welfare framework.
77
 This lack of 
enforcement is consistent with the argument that regulatory capture exists in Australia’s 
farm animal framework and that reform is required.  
 
4.4   Regulator acting as advocate for industry 
 
Another key effect of regulatory capture in an industry is that the regulator commonly 
adopts an advocacy role for the regulated industry.
78
 Where regulatory capture exists, it is 
not uncommon for the regulator to advocate for the industry they are meant to be 
regulating, causing the public interest purpose of the regulation to become subordinated.  
 
An example of this is seen in the current discussions relating to the enactment of laws, 
known as ‘ag-gag laws’, which seek to make it illegal for any person to obtain footage of 
                                                 
73
 Ellis, above 48, 21. 
74
 Ellis, above 48, 6. 
75
 Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice For The 
Welfare of Animals (2005), 9.  
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 David Turton, ‘Wading in: environmental governance and Queensland’s Clean Waters Act 1971’ (2010) 
17 James Cook University Law Review 46, 65.  
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animal cruelty on farm facilities, and for media organisations to broadcast such footage.
79
 
Similar laws have already been enacted in parts of the United States of America,
80
 which 




In Australia, a number of ministers who are responsible for the regulating departments 
have supported these laws, including New South Wales Minister for Primary Industries, 
Katrina Hodgkinson. Ms Hodgkinson stated that she would do everything in her power to 
end the activities of “animal activists”, referring to members of the public who record 
animal cruelty.
82
 Further, Federal Agriculture Minister, Barnaby Joyce, has given his 





As stated above, it is these third party tip-offs of cruelty that usually spark investigations 
into farm cruelty. A recent example of this is the evidence provided by Animals 
Australia
84
 of animal cruelty at an egg farm in New South Wales.
85
 The footage showed 
unhealthy layer hens in overcrowded cages and chickens that were trapped beneath their 
cages living in faeces.
86
 This footage was reported to the responsible regulator, resulting 
in an investigation where inspectors noted a number of problems and issued fines.
87
 The 
key point here is that a third party, not the regulator, uncovered the animal abuse. 
 
If the regulator, at the behest of a government minister or otherwise, supported the 
enactment of ag-gag laws, this would represent an attempt to make it unlawful for third 
parties like Animals Australia to obtain and provide evidence of animal cruelty to the 
regulator, RSPCA or police. This would not only make it more difficult for regulations to 
be effectively enforced in favour of the public interest, but would also demonstrate direct 
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advocacy by the regulator in favour of industry. Such laws would reduce the possibility 
of detecting animal cruelty and would make it easier for regulations to be breached. 
Advocacy for such laws by the regulator would be supporting the wishes of industry in 
relation to animal welfare; that is, less regulation and enforcement.
88
 It is argued that this 
is not unlikely given that the responsible ministers for some regulatory departments have 
already shown support for these laws.  
 
Although this paper is not examining live export in detail, another example consistent 
with the argument that the regulator advocates for industry is the reporting systems of the 
live export industry. DAFF and its delegate, the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service (AQIS), claim their website provides full high mortality investigation reports in 
relation to live export voyages.
89
 However, documents obtained through freedom of 
information applications revealed that AQIS failed to publish full reports, and in fact, had 
amended the reports to delete evidence of breaches to live export licences by their 
“clients”, namely industry licence holders.
90
 This concealment by the regulator is a clear 
example of regulator advocacy for industry. 
 
As has been argued in Part Two and Part Three, it is likely that regulatory capture exists 
in Australia’s farm animal welfare regime due to the conflicting responsibilities of the 
responsible regulator, which has serious consequences for the protection of farm animal 
welfare. This includes disproportionate industry influence, lack of enforcement and 
regulator advocacy for industry, which collectively undermine animal welfare. Part Four 
will now assess the options for reform, demonstrating that the IOAW would be a 
reasonable and effective solution.  
 
5.  Part Four – Reform and the need for the IOAW 
 
5.1   Options for reform 
 
The final part of this paper will critically examine how the IOAW could be created to 
effectively address regulatory capture, resulting in improved farm animal welfare 
outcomes.  In addition to being an effective option, the IOAW is a realistic solution in 
Australia as there is political support for its creation. The Australian Greens introduced 
                                                 
88
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the Voice for Animals (Independent Office of Animal Welfare) Bill 2013 to the Federal 




Although potentially being an effective solution, this part will also explore the possible 
shortfalls of the IOAW. In particular, its success will be dependent on resourcing, 
staffing, powers and the cooperation of State and Territory governments. 
 
Previous attempts have been made to address identified shortcomings in the regulation of 
farm animal welfare. Most of the issues caused by regulatory capture were raised in the 
Neumann Report.
92
 The Federal Government tried to respond to these issues by 
establishing the AAWS to, amongst other things, harmonise the regulatory standards and 
increase public consultation and scientific evidence throughout the drafting stages.
93
 
However, it is argued that this was not an effective solution as regulatory capture 
continued, and industry still retained significant influence and control over the drafting 
stages and scientific research. Further, with the recent removal of the AAWS, it is likely 
that any positive steps taken by the AAWS will no longer exist. Together, this 
demonstrates a present need for reform.  
 
There are a number of common reform options available when regulatory capture exists, 
including increasing transparency,
94
 increasing public participation,
95
 reviewing and 
amending regulations and reducing the discretionary powers of the regulator.
96
 However, 
where the capture is a result of poor regulatory design, an effective reform is to separate 
the conflicting responsibilities of the regulator into separate departments.
97
 Separating 
responsibilities has previously been suggested as an appropriate option for agencies that 




Similarly, as the farm animal welfare framework is captured due to poor regulatory 
design, an appropriate reform would be to separate these responsibilities into different 
departments. This could be achieved by creating a federal IOAW, which would be 
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responsible for farm animal welfare. This would allow farm animal welfare to be 
regulated by an independent regulator that does not have conflicts similar to the current 
departments, thereby assisting to remove the capture and its effects. 
 
5.2   Functions, powers and operations of the IOAW 
 
The IOAW would be a Commonwealth statutory authority responsible for animal welfare 
in relation to the use of animals in Commonwealth regulated activities. In order to be 
separated from DAFF, it would be appropriate for the IOAW to report to the Attorney-
General’s Department or the Department of the Environment. 
 
The IOAW would also be supported by a committee that consists of representatives from 
a range of stakeholders, including industry, animal welfare organisations, consumer 
groups and scientists.
99
 The Australian Greens suggests that such a committee would 




The IOAW would assume the responsibilities in relation to animal welfare that DAFF 
previously performed through the AAWS, in addition to new responsibilities, which will 
be discussed below.  
 
5.3   Achievements of the IOAW 
 
The first significant feature of the IOAW is that it would be an independent body, 
separate from DAFF, responsible for farm animal welfare in Australia. This in itself 
would be an important improvement to the current framework.  As examined in Part Two 
and Part Three, regulatory capture currently exists due to poor regulatory design. The 
IOAW would remove animal welfare responsibilities from DAFF, completely separating 
animal welfare from the conflicting responsibilities of productive and profitable primary 
industries. As a result, it is highly likely that farm animal welfare would be better 
regulated, as the IOAW would not have conflicting responsibilities and its foremost goals 
would not align with industry. Importantly, this would reduce industry’s disproportionate 
influence over the regulator. Although it is appropriate that industry is still considered a 
key stakeholder, those representing the public interest of animal welfare would likely be 
equally significant.  
 
Further, this separation would allow the IOAW to provide independent oversight of the 
regulatory framework at a national level, with the ability to publicly examine and critique 
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activities of DAFF. This would range from animal welfare issues in farm animal 
industries and live export, to the effectiveness of DAFF’s implementation of animal 




This independence could also improve the drafting stages of the MCOPs and standards 
and guidelines. The IOAW would have independence from disproportionate industry 
influence over the contents of the codes and would be better placed to provide regulatory 
oversight in this area. This would ensure that the development of codes is effective in 
achieving appropriate minimum standards for welfare that reflect community 
expectations.   
 
Second, the IOAW could also have a positive impact on the harmonisation of laws and 
regulations across Australia. While it is recognised that State and Territory departments 
would still be exposed to regulatory capture if they too did not create an independent 
office due to their similar conflicting responsibilities, a federal IOAW could significantly 
improve this situation. The IOAW could review standards and make recommendations on 
how national harmonisation could be accomplished. The benefits of having a national 
body coordinate animal welfare throughout Australia were seen with the AAWS prior to 
its abolition. States and Territories implemented the AAWS Standards and Guidelines,
102
 
demonstrating that national coordination of animal welfare can achieve nationally 
consistent and enforceable welfare standards, despite being led by a federal body that is 
not directly responsible for enforcement.  
 
This harmonisation is necessary to improve the current failings of farm animal welfare as 
a result of the regulatory capture. The Neumann Report identified that the lack of 
harmonisation of animal welfare standards has numerous negative consequences, 
including confusion within industry, increased chances of regulations being ignored, poor 
support to regulators, and failure to uphold community expectations of high animal 
welfare.
103
 The creation of the IOAW to implement harmonisation is timely, considering 
the recent abolition of the AAWAC.
104
 This AAWAC previously advised the Minister for 
Agriculture on nationally significant animal welfare issues and drove the implementation 
of the AAWS.
 
The IOAW could assume similar responsibilities and work towards 
ensuring that animal welfare laws and standards are consistent, streamline the process for 
                                                 
101
 Giuffre, above n 97.  
102
 See for example the Australian Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines for the Land Transport of 
Livestock.  
103
 Geoff Neumann & Associates Pty Ltd Review of the Australian Model Codes of Practice For The 
Welfare of Animals (2005), 9-10.  
104
 See for example, RSPCA, Australian Animal Welfare Advisory Committee Scrapped, 8 November 2013 
< http://www.rspca.org.au/media-centre/press-releases/2013/australian-animal-welfare-advisory-
committee-scrapped>. 









Third, the IOAW would be able to call inquiries, commission independent scientific 
research, prepare reports on their findings, and make recommendations in relation to 
animal welfare matters.
106
 Not only would this reduce the abovementioned influence 
industry has on research, it would additionally introduce accountability into the current 
regulatory framework. Further, the IOAW could provide these reports and 
recommendations to the Minister, who would be required to table them in Parliament and 
provide a response on record. This would ensure animal welfare had independent 
representation in Parliament; something that currently does not exist in Australia.
 107
    
 
It would be beneficial for the IOAW to create a central database to collate information 
from these inquiries and reports in addition to third party information. This could include 
matters such as compliance monitoring, charges and prosecutions, numbers of animals 
being produced and used, and provide an information repository of animal welfare 
research from all Australian jurisdictions and internationally. There is no present database 
of consistent, reliable and publicly accessible information in relation to animal welfare.
108
 
Not only would this be useful for public education, it would also be valuable in ensuring 





It is acknowledged that the success of the IOAW, similar to any government body, would 
be dependent on funding, the number of staff, and the powers given to it. It would also be 
dependent on the States and Territories adopting its recommendations, however this 
cooperation was seen with the AAWS. 
 
Ultimately, the IOAW could effectively remove the situation of regulatory capture that 
currently exists at a federal level, which would likely have positive flow on effects in the 
States and Territories.  
 
5.4   Constitutional issues 
 
A key issue that must be addressed when considering the creation of the IOAW is 
whether the Commonwealth has power to create such an office. The Australian 
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 does not address power to directly regulate animal welfare.
111
 However, 
the Constitution does provide the Commonwealth Government with indirect powers to 
make laws relating to animals, including the quarantine, fisheries, trade and commerce 
and external affairs powers.
 112
 These powers have been previously relied upon by the 
Commonwealth to enact laws relating to the international trade of animals and animal 
products, quarantine and biosecurity issues surrounding animal production, management 
of endangered, feral or invasive animals, and to sign treaties relating to animals.
113
 In 
fact, the Commonwealth Government had become increasingly involved in the regulation 
of farm animal welfare through the AAWS prior to its abolition, especially in relation to 
policy coordination.
114
 It is evident that these heads of powers could be relied upon again 
by the Commonwealth to create the IOAW. 
 
Further, national animal welfare schemes are not new to parliamentary discussions in 
Australia. In addition to the recent Voice for Animals (Independent Office of Animal 
Welfare) Bill 2013, Senator Bartlett introduced the National Animal Welfare Bill 2005 
(Cth). This Bill also relied on a range of heads of powers for Commonwealth intervention 
including the external affairs power, trade and commerce power and corporations 
powers.
115
 It also allowed for States and Territories to retain their animal welfare laws 
where it was capable of operating concurrently with the Bill.
116
 Although this Bill was 
not passed, the IOAW could rely on similar heads of powers. 
 
Alternatively, the trade and commerce power (s51(i)) or the corporations power (s51(xx)) 
could also be an appropriate head of power for the creation of the IOAW, as a large 
percentage of farm animal products are supplied and controlled by a handful of 
corporations.
117
 For example, 80 percent of chicken meat is produced by two 
corporations
118





Finally, an alternative way to form the IOAW would be through an intergovernmental 
agreement between the States and Territories and the Commonwealth Government. This 
is not an uncommon option, especially where resources are needed to effectively regulate 
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an area. As discussed earlier, there is a current lack of resources in farm animal welfare. 
McEwen argues that the Commonwealth Government has the necessary resources to 
effectively manage a national animal welfare statutory authority,
 120
 such as the IOAW. 
Should the States and Territories agree that federal resources are needed, an 
intergovernmental agreement could be entered into in relation to animal welfare. This 
option was used to create the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth) through the execution of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the 
Environment, after it was agreed that the Commonwealth Government’s resources were 




Overall, there are a number of options available to the Commonwealth Government to 
create the IOAW in a manner that complies with the Constitution. A number of these 
options have already been explored in previously proposed national animal welfare 
schemes and also in other areas, such as the environment.   
 
6.  Conclusion  
 
The current framework regulating farm animal welfare in Australia reflects a state of 
regulatory capture, due to the regulatory departments having conflicting responsibilities 
of profitable primary industries and animal welfare. This creates a series of regulatory 
shortcomings including lack of enforcement by the regulator, disproportionate influence 
by industry and the regulator adopting an advocacy role for industry. This leads to a 
situation where the public interest of good animal welfare is not met, despite claims 
Australia is an international leader in animal welfare.  
 
As demonstrated throughout this paper, an effective and efficient solution would be the 
establishment of the IOAW. The Commonwealth Government has a range of powers 
available to it to lawfully create the IOAW. The IOAW could assist in resolving the 
situation of regulatory capture by bringing about an independent federal body that is 
responsible for farm animal welfare. Whilst, the success of the IOAW is dependent on 
factors such as funding, powers and staffing, ultimately, it would significantly improve 
the current situation and assist in ensuring the public interest of good animal welfare is 
upheld.  
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